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Abstract
Background—States have attempted to reduce prescription opioid abuse through strengthening 
the regulation of pain management clinics; however, the effect of such measures remains unclear. 
We quantified the impact of Texas’s September 2010 “pill mill” law on opioid prescribing and 
utilization.
Methods—We used the IMS Health LRx LifeLink database to examine anonymized, patient-
level pharmacy claims for a closed cohort of individuals filling prescription opioids in Texas 
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between September 2009 and August 2011. Our primary outcomes were derived at a monthly level 
and included: (1) average morphine equivalent dose (MED) per transaction; (2) aggregate opioid 
volume; (3) number of opioid prescriptions; and (4) quantity of opioid pills dispensed. We 
compared observed values with the counterfactual, which we estimated from pre-intervention 
levels and trends.
Results—Texas’s pill mill law was associated with declines in average MED per transaction 
(−0.57 mg/month, 95% confidence interval [CI] −1.09, −0.057), monthly opioid volume (−9.99 
kg/month, CI −12.86, −7.11), monthly number of opioid prescriptions (−12,200 prescriptions/
month, CI −15,300, −9,150) and monthly quantity of opioid pills dispensed (−714,000 pills/month, 
CI −877,000, −550,000). These reductions reflected decreases of 8.1–24.3% across the outcomes 
at one year compared with the counterfactual, and they were concentrated among prescribers and 
patients with the highest opioid prescribing and utilization at baseline.
Conclusions—Following the implementation of Texas’s 2010 pill mill law, there were clinically 
significant reductions in opioid dose, volume, prescriptions and pills dispensed within the state, 
which were limited to individuals with higher levels of baseline opioid prescribing and utilization.
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1. Introduction
The abuse and diversion of prescription opioids has reached epidemic proportions in the 
United States. In 2013, death from drug overdose, of which more than one-third involved 
prescription opioids, was the number one cause of injury-related death in America, 
surpassing deaths due to motor vehicle collisions among individuals 25–64 years of age 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention CDC, 2014). Although individuals who misuse 
opioid pain relievers obtain them from a variety of sources, most originate from licensed 
prescribers (Inciardi et al., 2010). From that original source, opioids that are prescribed for 
appropriate indications may be misused by the patient or shared with friends and family 
members. However, in other cases, the original prescription is not obtained from a provider 
following recommended medical practices but rather is obtained from a physician in a “pill 
mill,” a pain management clinic whose providers operate outside the boundaries of standard 
medical practice by prescribing large quantities of opioids and other controlled substances 
with minimal medical oversight (CDC, 2012).
Historically, Texas has been among the four states in the nation with the highest 
concentration of pill mills (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2013). In 2009, Texas 
legislators addressed this problem by passing “pill mill” legislation, requiring all pain 
management clinics to be certified by the Texas Medical Board on a biennial basis and to be 
owned and operated by a licensed physician, effective September 1, 2010. Clinic owners 
must be present at the clinic for at least one-third of operating hours and must personally 
review at least one-third of all patient files. Additionally, clinic owners must annually verify 
the qualifications and licensure of all employees (Texas Legislature Online, 2010). Prior to 
2009, the Texas Medical Board had no regulations concerning the operation or ownership of 
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pain management clinics (Zuzek, 2013); in some cases, the process of establishing a pill mill 
required little more than buying property, employing minimally trained staff, and hiring a 
figurehead physician under whose name opioids or other controlled substances could be 
prescribed (Houston Chronicle, 2010). With the implementation of Texas’s pill mill law, 
Texas Medical Board employees are expected to inspect all pain management clinics as 
often as necessary to verify compliance with the law and may revoke physicians’ licenses for 
failure to comply with its provisions (Zuzek, 2013 and Keel, 2013).
Although we (Daubresse et al., 2015) and others (Ringwait et al., 2015; Hackman et al., 
2014; Surratt et al., 2014 and Reisman et al., 2009) have used quasi-experimental methods to 
evaluate the effect of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs), to our knowledge, 
no studies have empirically evaluated the unique effect of a state’s implementation of a pill 
mill law in absence of a concurrent PDMP. This distinction is important because these 
policies differ in meaningful ways. Among their uses, PDMPs address high-risk patient 
behaviors, such as “doctor shopping”, by enabling stakeholders such as physicians and 
pharmacists to access patients’ comprehensive prescription histories. These programs may 
also be proactively used to identify prescribers who prescribe controlled substances more 
frequently than their peers. In contrast, pill mill laws primarily address inappropriate 
controlled substance prescribing by requiring pain management clinics to abide by basic best 
practices, such as ensuring that physicians meet with patients (CDC, 2013). The Texas 
PDMP was implemented prior to our study period and is thus considered a constant. We 
sought to evaluate the impact of Texas’s pill mill law on opioid prescribing and utilization.
2. Methods
2.1. Data
We analyzed prescription claims data obtained from the IMS Health LifeLink LRx 
Anonymized Longitudinal Prescription database. These data represent de-identified, patient-
level transactions from retailers throughout the United States, representing approximately 
65% of retail prescription transactions in the country. IMS Health receives weekly data from 
food stores, mass merchandisers, and independent as well as chain drug stores. These data 
include information about prescribers (specialty and zip code), patients (age, sex, and date of 
first pharmacy transaction), and transactions (product type, National Drug Code [NDC], 
dosage, days’ supply and quantity of pills dispensed, out-of-pocket and total costs), 
pharmacy type, and source of payment (Medicare, Medicaid, commercial insurance and 
cash). The use and analysis of this data were deemed exempt from review by the Johns 
Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Institutional Review Board.
2.2. Time segments and subjects
We divided our 24-month observation period into a 12-month pre-intervention period 
preceding the policy intervention (September, 2009 through August, 2010) and a 12-month 
post-intervention period following the policy intervention (September, 2010 through August, 
2011).
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We derived a closed cohort of patients who had claims activity throughout the 24-month 
observation period. To do so, we first excluded observations from stores that did not have 
consistent reporting of data to IMS Health throughout the entire period of interest. Next, we 
derived a closed cohort of patients by selecting those who had any prescription claims 
activity 3-months before and after the first and last month of observation, thus allowing us to 
minimize the bias introduced from patients entering into and exiting out of our cohort. We 
also excluded spurious observations, such as those with zero or negative values, or that 
represented extreme values, such as those with a morphine equivalent dose (MED) per 
transaction greater than 360 mg (see Supplementary Table 3) (Ohio State Board of 
Pharmacy, 2013). Such values, which can arise during claims processing and adjudication, 
accounted for 0.01% of the raw data and are unlikely to have affected the accuracy of the 
analysis. Our final data set consisted of 8.3 million patients, approximately one-third of the 
total population of Texas in 2010. As expected, our subjects were more likely to be female 
and more likely to be older, with a median age of 44, than those of a representative 
population of Texans based on the 2010 Census.
2.3. Analysis
We examined four outcomes, each of which was calculated on a monthly basis and derived 
twice to represent prescriber-and patient-level transactions. The first outcome we examined 
was average morphine equivalent dose (MED) per transaction, which represents a 
standardized metric for comparing opioids after accounting for prescription dose and 
potency using an opioid conversion table created by the CDC (Ohio State Board of 
Pharmacy, 2013). The morphine equivalent daily dose (MEDD), which is equivalent to the 
MED divided by the days’ supply, is extensively used by medical organizations, such as the 
American Academy of Pain Medicine and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
in order to define threshold opioid doses above which prespecified clinical action should be 
taken. The MED, expressed in milligrams, is calculated as the product of the number of 
opioid pills dispensed, the strength of the opioid prescribed (in milligrams), and the 
equianalgesic morphine conversion factor. The morphine conversion factor is derived from 
prior work characterizing long-term opioid therapy for noncancer pain (Von Korff et al., 
2008). These conversion factors account for differences in oral, transdermal, and 
transmucosal preparations based on assumptions of the bioavailability of different 
formulations. Higher MED is associated with increased risk for opioid overdose-related 
mortality and is thus an important measure to characterize (Bohnert et al., 2011; Gomes et 
al., 2011). Second, we examined the total opioid volume across all transactions. This 
measure quantifies the total amount of opioids dispensed each month by combining the total 
MED across all transactions to provide market-level information about the volume of opioid 
utilization in each state while accounting for differences in molecule type and strength. 
Third, we examined the total number of opioid prescriptions filled per month, since changes 
in the first two outcomes could occur independently of changes in the number of 
prescription transactions each month. Finally, we examined the quantity of opioid pills 
dispensed, since as with the number of transactions, pill-volume could change independently 
of the other measures examined. We chose to include opioids such as tramadol and 
tapentadol, however we excluded claims for codeine cough syrups and similar preparations.
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We used a segmented linear regression, which assumes normally distributed regression 
coefficients (and thus mean values that are equal to median values), to quantify the impact of 
the policy intervention on each outcome of interest (Wagner et al., 2002). Each segment of 
the time series was defined by two parameters: the level, defined as the value of the outcome 
at the beginning of the time segment, and the trend, defined as the rate of change in the 
outcome over a given time segment. In the regression model, we specified the level by an 
indicator variable denoting before or after the intervention and we specified the trend by a 
continuous variable detailing the time in months before or since the intervention. The overall 
effect of the intervention was derived as a comparison between the observed values and the 
counterfactual value, estimated by extrapolating the model fit in the baseline period out into 
the post-law period. Each model was checked for autocorrelation across time using the 
generalized Durbin–Watson test and corrected using the appropriate autocorrelation order 
(proc autoreg command with nlag function in SAS version 9.4). The adjusted models had R2 
values between 80 and 95%, indicating that the models explained much of the variability in 
the data.
In addition to analyzing the aggregate dataset, we performed regression analyses on 
stratified subsets of the data, based on pre-intervention prescribing and utilization levels of 
prescribers and patients, respectively. First, we ranked all prescribers and all patients by their 
baseline total opioid volume prescription and utilization, respectively. We then stratified 
each group into quartiles and top percentiles, including the top 90th, 95th, 97th, and 99th 
percentiles. We then conducted analyses within each strata of patient and prescriber to 
examine whether the impact of the pill mill law varied among different subpopulations of 
these prescribers and patients.
2.4. Sensitivity analyses
We tested the stability of our estimates through multiple sensitivity analyses. First, we varied 
the observation period from 24 months to 12 months (March, 2010 through February, 2011) 
and 36 months (March, 2009 through February, 2012). Next, we converted our closed cohort 
into an open cohort by removing the requirement for patients to have claims activity 
throughout the entire observation period. We then repeated our main analyses, including 
outliers to account for all claims representing high-risk utilization or diversion. Finally, we 
repeated our main analyses excluding oxycontin to account for its tamper-resistant 
reformulation in 2010.
3. Results
3.1. Patient, prescriber, and pharmacy characteristics and baseline prescribing and 
utilization
Our final data set included 8.3 million patients, 737,123 providers, and 37,260 stores. 
Between September 2009 and August 2011, there were 724 million prescription transactions 
observed, of which 10.5% were for opioids.
Table 1 presents the baseline levels and trends of our four outcome measures. For example, 
twelve months prior to the implementation of the pill mill law, the baseline average MED 
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per transaction was 54.6 mg/month (95% CI 52.1, 57.2), with a non-statistically significant 
declining trend of −0.11 mg/month (95% CI−0.43, 0.20).
3.2. Effect of pill mill law
Fig. 1 depicts the observed monthly opioid volume and MED in the entire time period as 
well as the corresponding counterfactuals had the pill mill law not been implemented. For 
example, the effect on average MED per transaction appeared to lag by 1 month, after which 
there was a steady two-month decline followed by a steady state through the remainder of 
the observation period. In contrast, total opioid volume steadily declined for the first 5 
months after the policy intervention, followed by a small one-month increase and an 
approximate steady state for the following 5 months. The trend in total number of 
prescriptions written and quantity of opioid pills dispensed following the pill mill law 
displayed a pattern similar to that of the total opioid volume in that each of these outcomes 
declined for the first 5 months and then reached a relative steady state.
Table 2 depicts the quantitative magnitude of these changes, which were statistically 
significant across all outcomes. For example, the average MED per transaction declined by 
−0.57 mg/month (95% CI −1.09, −0.06), while the total opioid volume across all 
transactions declined by approximately −9.99 kg/month (95% CI −12.9, −7.11), which, if 
applied evenly across all patients in the cohort, is equivalent to a monthly reduction of 
approximately −1.2 mg MED per patient per month. Relative to the baseline upward trend of 
0.68 mg MED per patient per month (95% CI 0.44, 0.92), which represents the month-to-
month increase in the average MED per patient during the 12 months prior to the 
intervention and is derived from the β1 term of the segmented regression for opioid volume 
divided by the number of patients in the cohort (Wagner et al., 2002), the post-intervention 
downward trend of −1.2 mg MED per patient per month represents a 276% (95% CI 230%, 
373%) decline in the monthly opioid volume trend. Similarly, the total number of 
prescriptions written in the state decreased by −12,200 prescriptions/month (95% CI 
−15,300, −9,150) and the quantity of opioid pills dispensed fell by −714,000 pills/month 
(95% CI −877,000, 550,000).
Table 3 depicts reductions in each of the four outcome measures during the first 6 months, 
second 6 months, and cumulatively for 12 months after the policy intervention by 
quantifying the difference between the observed and predicted values of each measure. For 
example, 12 months after the pill mill law was implemented, the observed average MED per 
transaction was 48.2 mg/month, 8.1% lower than the expected 52.5 mg/month based on the 
pre-intervention levels and trends. Similarly, one year after the intervention, the state-wide 
total opioid volume, total number of opioid prescriptions, and total quantity of opioid pills 
dispensed were 24.3%, 22.8%, and 19.5% lower than what would have been expected, 
respectively.
3.3. Policy effect stratified by prescribers’ baseline opioid prescription volume
Table 4 and Fig. 2 demonstrate that the effects of the policy were greatest among prescribers 
with the highest baseline opioid prescribing volume. For example, among prescribers with 
the highest quartile opioid volume at baseline (N = 85,354), the policy was associated with 
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statistically and clinically significant reductions in MED (−0.56 mg/month), opioid volume 
(−9.92 kg/month), number of opioid prescriptions (−11,800 prescriptions/month), and 
quantity of opioid pills dispensed (−707,000/month). In contrast, among prescribers with the 
lowest quartile opioid volume at baseline (N = 80,454), the policy was not associated with 
any statistically significant changes in the outcomes examined.
3.4. Policy effect on opioid sales stratified by patients’ baseline opioid use
Table 5 and Fig. 3 depict similar information for patients stratified by their volume of 
baseline opioid use. As was observed for prescribers, patients with the highest baseline 
opioid utilization experienced the greatest reductions in outcome measures following the 
intervention. Patients in the highest quartile of baseline opioid utilization experienced 
statistically significant and clinically meaningful reductions in MED (−0.51 mg/month), 
total opioid volume (−8.07 kg/month), number of opioid prescriptions (−6350 prescriptions/
month), and quantity of opioid pills dispensed (−510,000 pills/month). In contrast, patients 
in the lowest quartile of baseline opioid utilization experienced statistically significant 
reductions in only three of the outcomes examined, with magnitudes of changes that were 
not clinically significant. Among these patients, total opioid volume declined by −0.14 kg/
month, number of opioid prescriptions declined by −1120 prescriptions/month, and quantity 
of opioid pills dispensed declined by −23,800 pills/month.
3.5. Results of sensitivity analyses
Varying the observation period from 24 months to 12 and 36 months provided results that 
were similar in trend but different in magnitude (Supplementary Table 1). For example, 
estimates of reductions in the quantity of opioid pills dispensed varied from −1.3 million 
[M] pills/month (95% CI −1.7 M, −0.90 M) using a 12-month window to −0.54 M pills/
month (95% CI −0.63 M, −0.45 M) using a 36-month window. Use of an open cohort 
yielded findings that varied somewhat across measures. For example, estimates of the 
decline in average MED per transaction were larger (−0.65 mg/month, 95% CI −1.21, 
−0.072) and estimates of the decline in total opioid volume were smaller (−3.62 kg/month, 
95% CI −6.49, −0.76), while there was no statistically significant effect of the policy on 
quantity of opioid pills dispensed or number of opioid prescriptions (Supplementary Table 
2). However, using an open cohort reduced our ability to make direct comparisons between 
the pre- and post-policy periods as the estimates reflect differences in the population with 
prescription transactions across time, in addition to differences attributable to the policy 
change. Analyses including outliers were similar to our main analyses in trend and statistical 
significance, but increased in magnitude (−9.99 kg/month vs. −10.66 kg/month). Exclusion 
of oxycontin did not result in substantive differences from our main analyses.
4. Discussion
We evaluated the impact of Texas’s 2010 pill mill law on opioid prescribing and utilization. 
At one year following its implementation, we identified statistically and clinically significant 
reductions attributable to the policy in each of the outcomes examined. For example, there 
was an approximate 8% reduction in average morphine equivalent dose per transaction, 24% 
reduction in total opioid volume, 23% reduction in the total number of opioid prescriptions, 
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and 20% reduction in total quantity of opioid pills dispensed. These reductions were 
concentrated among patients and prescribers with the highest baseline opioid use and 
prescribing.
To our knowledge, our study represents one of the first rigorous analyses evaluating the 
effect of pill mill law implementation (Haegerich et al., 2014). This is important because of 
the magnitude of the opioid epidemic and the increasing number of states that have 
implemented pill mill laws. The magnitude of reductions we examined was substantial. For 
example, we estimate that by one year following implementation of the law, the volume of 
opioids that was taken out of circulation is equivalent to the volume needed to supply every 
45–49 year old in Texas with a week’s supply of continuous, round-the-clock Vicodin 
(CDC, 2015).
Our study contributes to the growing body of research assessing the effectiveness of state-
level interventions aimed at reducing the opioid abuse and diversion epidemic. States have 
taken many approaches toward addressing this problem, ranging from education outreach 
programs and clinical guidelines to prescription drug monitoring programs; however, the 
evidence assessing the effectiveness of many of these interventions remains limited 
(Haegerich et al., 2014). A longitudinal analysis examining the impact of state-monitored 
triplicate prescription forms on benzodiazepine utilization suggests state-level interventions 
decrease use of prescribed controlled substances (Simoni-Wastila et al., 2004). Given the 
high implementation and opportunity costs of such interventions, additional evidence to 
inform the optimal approaches that states can use is particularly valuable (Finklea et al., 
2014).
Our study raises several questions for further investigation. It is unknown what effect the 
changes that we document have had on opioid-related injuries and deaths. An evaluation of 
Florida’s 2010 PDMP and pill mill law found that the number of drug overdose deaths 
decreased by 16.7% in the 2 years following the policy interventions (Johnson et al., 2012). 
In addition, prior studies have demonstrated the association between changes in opioid 
prescribing and opioid-related mortality (Bohnert et al., 2011; Dunn et al., 2010; Gwira 
Baumblatt et al., 2014; Daubresse et al., 2013). Additionally, it is important to characterize 
changes in pain treatment patterns following pill mill law enactment, such as the use of non-
opioid analgesics and non-pharmacologic treatments for pain (Sauber-Schatz et al., 2013). It 
is also unknown what impact pill mill laws have on the trafficking of illicit opioids and 
whether specific features of these laws, such as variations in the consequences for 
noncompliance, influence their impact.
Our study has several limitations. First, we did not have access to diagnostic or other clinical 
information that would have allowed us to have greater insight regarding the clinical 
appropriateness of the prescribing and utilization observed. Similarly, because we did not 
have mortality data, we were not able to correlate trends in opioid prescribing with trends in 
opioid-related mortality. Second, our data source does not capture transactions occurring 
through non-retail channels such as hospitals or long-term care facilities, although these 
settings are not the focus of pill mill laws. Third, we did not choose to investigate whether 
the pill mill law impacted the extent to which overlapping opioids are prescribed. For this 
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reason, we derived the monthly average MED per transaction using the method used by the 
CDC and other organizations (Ohio State Board of Pharmacy, 2013) rather than deriving an 
average MED per patient using a method that would account for overlapping prescriptions 
among individual patients. Fourth, the results of our sensitivity analyses differed from the 
primary analysis in magnitude and statistical significance; despite this variation, the 
direction of effect and clinical interpretation of the results remained the same. Fifth, we 
limited our main analyses to observations provided by stores that consistently reported data 
throughout the study period; this limited the number of observations available for analysis 
but insured that our results reflected differences attributable to the policy change rather than 
differences caused by changes in the source of prescription data. Sixth, our analysis did not 
include a comparison state to control for any changes that may have occurred on a national 
level. This decision was made because neighboring states had implemented their own policy 
changes in close proximity to Texas’s pill mill law, making direct comparisons difficult; 
however, we are unaware of any national-level changes that would have influenced 
prescription transactions during our observation period. Seventh, due to the lack of detailed 
data regarding the implementation and enforcement of the pill mill law in Texas, our study 
was not designed to assess the quality of its implementation. Finally, we were unable to rule 
out other events in Texas that may have contributed to the noted declines. However, we do 
not know of any other state-level policies occurring in Texas over the observation period that 
could have affected our results. Sensitivity analyses accounting for the reformulation of 
oxycodone in 2010 supported findings from our main analysis.
The abuse and diversion of prescription opioids represents a complex and multifaceted 
public health problem. Our analysis contributes to an understanding of the extent to which 
the regulation of pill mills plays a role in addressing this epidemic. Our analysis 
demonstrates that the enactment of Texas’s pill mill law resulted in substantial reductions in 
average morphine equivalent dose per transaction, opioid volume, number of opioid 
prescriptions, and quantity of opioid pills among providers and patients with the highest 
baseline levels of opioid prescribing and utilization, respectively.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Total opioid volume and average morphine equivalent dose, September 2009–August 2011.
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Total opioid volume, by top prescriber percentile*, September 2009–August 2011.
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Average morphine equivalent dose per transaction, by patient quartile*, September 2009–
August 2011.
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